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ABSTRACT
Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman
exhibit several related dialectical methods
relevant to Platonic education: maieutic in
Theaetetus, bifurcatory division in Sophist and
Statesman, and non-bifurcatory division in
Statesman, related to the ‘god-given’ method
in Philebus. I consider the nature of each
method through the letter or element (στοιχεῖον)
paradigm, used to reflect on each method. At
issue are the element’s appearances in given
contexts, its fitness for communing with other
elements like it in kind, and its own nature
defined through its relations to others. These
represent stages of inquiry for the Platonic
student inquiring into the sources of knowledge.
Keywords: method, metaphysics, epistemology,
ontology
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Dialectical Methods and the Stoicheia Paradigm in Plato’s Trilogy and Philebus

I. INTRODUCTION
While Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman dialogues bear clear narrative and dramatic
kinships, the relationship of the philosophical
methods depicted in each is unclear.1 The twoday period of discussion in which the dialogues
are set begins with Socrates’ maieutic inquiry
into the views of the young mathematician Theaetetus and concludes with the Eleatic Stranger’s
diairetic account of the statesman as a determinate moment in the care for the human community. This dramatic procession raises many
questions, such as those of why Plato chose to
link together dramatically these dialectical exercises, whether and how one method or dialogue
acts as a proleptic anticipation of another, and
what sense, if any, we can make of their unity.2
In what follows, I seek to offer the beginning
of an answer to these by arguing that Plato’s trilogy exhibits a series of related methods of inquiry into the sources of knowledge, representing a
set of dialectical exercises relevant to a Platonic
education and the increasing philosophical maturity of the student.3 These methods include
the maieutic method depicted in the Theaetetus,
the method of bifurcatory division initiated in
the Sophist and partially continued in the Statesman, and the method of non-bifurcatory division employed by the Stranger in the second half
of the Statesman.4 Since the Stranger does not
make the aim of this final method clear, I will
here consider it with reference to the method of
inquiry described in the Philebus and referred to
in the literature as the ‘god-given method.’5
It is difficult to track these large shifts in limited space. To understand these methods and
their relation to one another, we will here follow
the guidance offered by the paradigm of letters
or elements (στοιχεῖα) in each instance.6 Plato
frequently has his primary interlocutors make
epistemological moves with reference to let-

ters, including in key moments in the Republic,
and the speakers draw on this paradigm in the
dramatic moments in the near vicinity of each
methodological change in the trilogy.7 Thus the
letter paradigm offers a fixed point of orientation for considering the nature of each of the
three methods.8 At issue in these changes are,
among other things, the notion of the element
as part, its role in composing a whole, its recognizability as such, its appearances in given
contexts, its fitness for communing with other
elements like it in kind, and its own nature as
defined by its relations to others like it in kind.
Ultimately, I argue that the methodological
changes in the trilogy map onto three senses of
account (λόγος) through which knowledge is
attained. These roughly correspond to the three
senses of account at issue late in the Theaetetus
(Theait. 206 d 1 - 208 d 9). In his final definition of knowledge, Theaetetus hypothesizes that
knowledge is “true opinion with an account”
(Plat., Theait. 201 c 8.)9 Socrates then considers three possible senses of ‘account,’ which, I
argue, correspond to the methodological moves
made throughout the dialogues composing the
trilogy. The first type of account Socrates considers is that in which one makes “one’s thought
apparent vocally by means of words and verbal
expressions […] like reflections upon water
or in a mirror” (Plat., Theait. 206 d 1-4). This
type of account is closely related to the maieutic
method in the Theaetetus, insofar as the task in
maieutic is to externalize the internal by reflecting thought in an account, exposing it in its nature and presenting it for scrutiny. At issue in
the Sophist and Statesman will be the latter two
types of account that Socrates identifies. The
second is the account that entails “being able,
when questioned about what a thing is, to give
an answer by reference to its elements” (Plat.,
Theait. 206 e 10 – 207 d 2), which will be at stake
in the non-bifurcatory divisions of the States-
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man. The third, “being able to tell some mark
by which the object you are asked about differs
from all other things” (Plat., Theait. 208 c 8-9),
anticipates the aim of the Stranger in practicing bifurcatory division in the Sophist and early
Statesman.10 I suggest that these three types of
account represent three stages of inquiry for the
student of Platonic philosophy inquiring into
the sources of knowledge and her means of noetically grasping them with reference to parts
constitutive of wholes and co-constituted by
other parts like them in kind.

II. MAIEUTIC IN THE
THEAETETUS
In the Theaetetus, the interlocutors seek
a satisfying account of knowledge through
Socrates’ familiar question and answer process.
Socrates here acts in the role of the midwife, and
he reflects on the maieutic method (Plat., Theait.
149 a 1 – 151 d 5) by describing it as helping
the interlocutor to make progress by “discovering and bringing forth many beautiful things
themselves out of themselves” (Plat., Theait.
150 d 5-9).11 This corresponds to Socrates’ later
consideration of one sense of account as making
“thought apparent vocally by means of words
and verbal expressions […] like reflections upon
water or in a mirror” (Plat., Theait. 206 d 1-4).
He describes the ‘birthing’ process as leading to
the subsequent test of the result in terms of its
truth or falsity (Plat., Theait 150 c 1-5). In these
ways, the maieutic method entails externalizing
the internal by submitting the internal to an account, and hence to scrutiny. With these goals
in mind, Socrates limits his involvement to
helping to give birth to the ideas of Theaetetus,
rather than revealing his own.12 Thus Theaetetus
is responsible for the hypotheses that direct the
discussion, while Socrates is responsible for un-
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packing the entailments of each hypothesis. In
other words, Socrates uses the maieutic method
as a means of assisting the interlocutor in the
production of the account already implicit in
the interlocutor’s own thinking.
The maieutic method used in the dialogue
contrasts with a discussion of mathematical
knowledge early in the text. This discussion
points beyond itself to the next step necessary
after maieutic, although the interlocutors will
not take it up until the dramatically later dialogues. In his discussion of mathematical powers (Plat., Theait. 147 d 3 – 148 b 4), Theaetetus
describes his goal of understanding the oneness
inherent in many mathematical objects and accounting for the objects with reference to this
oneness. This is what he calls the attempt to
“gather together [the powers in question] into
some one [term], [to] which we could address
our speech”.13 In other words, Theaetetus’ goal
in this mathematical study is to understand
many in terms of their sameness, or to account
for the one inherent in many. But Theaetetus
ultimately fails to find a way to turn this mathematical method of gathering and sorting into
an account of the means by which knowledge
is attained.
The maieutic method is useful insofar as
it acts as a propaedeutic to more systematic
studies. The seeming aporia inherent in the
dialogue’s conclusion is in fact provocative of
further considerations, and suggests ways in
which Socrates’ three conceptions of ‘account’
anticipate the turns taken the next day in the
Sophist and Statesman.14 The key to allowing the
aporia to provoke further studies lies in considering the moves that Socrates and Theaetetus make after hypothesizing that knowledge
is “true opinion with an account”. Here we will
consider the letter paradigm, which arises in the
context of spelling and the recognition of syllables and letters as one of several examples that
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Socrates and Theaetetus take up in seeking to
understand the senses in which a thing can be
known.15 Socrates asks Theaetetus to consider
the spelling of his own name (Θεαίτητος) and
establishes that knowledge of the spelling of
Theaetetus’ name is easily demonstrated by one
who is able to lay out the letters of the name in
its correct order. He asks Theaetetus, though, to
consider the case of the person who can spell
‘Θεαίτητος’ but misspells ‘Θεόδωρος’, replacing
the theta with a tau (Plat., Theait. 207a 8 – 208
c 3). Socrates demonstrates that this misspelling
of the second name shows that the speller in fact
did not know how to spell ‘Θεαίτητος’, but instead merely had the right opinion regarding the
spelling, since the speller could not reproduce
the spelling of the same first syllable (‘Θε-’) in
the new context of a second name. This invokes
the senses of right opinion and knowledge at
play in Socrates’ description of the divided line
analogy in the Republic, where ‘right opinion’
is guided by partial or mediated access to the
source and ‘knowledge’ entails a direct noetic
grasp of the source.
Socrates’ observation here points to latent
positive content in the conclusion of the Theaetetus. Knowledge of a thing, here the spelling
of the name ‘Θεαίτητος’, entails the recognition
of the major component parts of the thing in all
of their manifestations. In other words, grasp of
the object of knowledge sought here, the name,
has only occurred when the name’s syllables,
and the letters that compose them, are recognized in every instance. Knowledge, we thus
have learned, entails an account of the sameness
inherent in the constitutive elements of wholes,
which are themselves both a one (as a whole)
and many (as comprising elements). That is,
‘Θε’ is a one, in that it is one thing that can be
known, and hence an object of a sort of knowledge. But it comprises parts, ‘Θ’ and ‘ε’, and

hence is many; recognition of it thus requires an
understanding of its parts.
The maieutic method entails treating each
entity as a whole. In other words, to give birth
to one’s thinking into an account entails beginning with a given concept, articulating it, and
interrogating the structure of the concept as it
has appeared from out of one’s pre-discursive
thinking. This in itself is valuable, because
things manifest themselves to us as unified singulars (ones) that require deeper analysis to be
captured in their essentiality, or, in other words,
captured in an account of their manifold being
(insofar as they are many). It furthermore entails a process of developing and examining the
account, testing it for strengths and weaknesses
before allowing it to be assessed as a true insight
or a wind egg. But the maieutic method stops
short of offering a means of proceeding from the
given entity qua the unified whole in which it
presents itself into an account of the thing qua
complex object structured by determinate elements. An employment of it does not clarify the
ways in which these elements commune with
other elements that are outside of it and like
it in kind. Because the maieutic method does
not have a mechanism by which sameness and
difference between things can be accounted, it
has shown itself to be insufficient for attaining
knowledge in the strictest sense and hence to
serve as a proleptic exercise for further studies.
We see this when we consider that the answer to the question, ‘How does one spell the
name “Θεαίτητος?”’, cannot be ensured to derive from knowledge and not right opinion in
the senses that Socrates distinguishes in the
divided line analogy in the Republic. Knowledge of the spelling of the name ‘Θεαίτητος’
is only attained when each of the component
parts is understood in its own nature. The
speller who cannot recognize the elements in
other settings, as in the case of the same letter
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and same syllable in the different setting of the
name Θεόδωρος, has not grasped the nature of
the elements in the initial instance. Hence the
speller has neither knowledge of the elements
nor of the whole. Likewise, one who knows the
individual letters composing the name does not
have knowledge of the spelling of Theaetetus’
name until she can order the letters properly
relative to an understanding of the nature of the
name.16 Put differently, Theaetetus is unable to
apply the urge to assimilate many into oneness
through an account in the case of non-mathematical objects of knowledge in the manner in
which he gathered together the mathematical
powers into oneness. If he is to make progress
in the next day’s investigation, Theaetetus will
need a means of doing this. In these ways, the
letter paradigm points to the next step necessary
toward a more robust and exhaustive account of
the source of knowledge.

III. BIFURCATORY DIVISION
IN THE SOPHIST AND
STATESMAN
In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger becomes
heir to Socrates’ discourse from the preceding
day. In this change, the role of the midwife is
replaced by that of the dialectician. The maieutic method entails the midwife (e.g., Socrates)
aiding the interlocutor in the production of the
account already implicitly operative in the interlocutor’s own thinking. An important shift
happens here insofar as the Stranger’s methods,
bifurcatory and non-bifurcatory division, are
oriented by receptivity. That is, the move from
maieutic to diairesis entails a refocusing of the
direction of the inquiry from the midwife supporting the productive interlocutor to the interlocutors receiving and accounting for the nature
of the world.17 This is reflected in the shift of fo-
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cus from the first to the second and third senses
of account in the Theaetetus, which are oriented
around the account-giver in the first instance
and the nature of the object in the second and
third instances.
In the Sophist, the interlocutors seek to disclose the essence of the sophist, as well as the
paradigmatic example of the angler, through
bifurcatory division. This entails splitting the
proposed kind in two, always keeping to the
right hand part of the section and holding fast
to the community to which the kind belongs
until stripping away all of the kind’s common
features and leaving it in its indwelling nature
(Plat., Soph. 264 e 9 – 265 a 1). 18 Hence, in the
paradigmatic example, the angler is divided
relative to binary halves before being shown to
be the expert in getting, and specifically the manipulative hunting of animals, and specifically
wetland-dwelling fish, who strikes by hooking
in daylight from below (Plat., Soph. 221 b 3 – c
2). Reflecting on method elsewhere, the Stranger describes bifurcatory division as entailing
the isolation of “one form extended everywhere
through many things” by establishing difference
among objects through taking up a single one
(e.g., hunting) as a coherent, immediately intuitable whole.19 This whole is then divided into
parts (e.g, hunting by night and hunting by day)
that are themselves further divisible. In doing
so, the whole is disclosed with reference to the
binary halves that compose it, and its essence is
articulated through an account of the halves in
which it is has a share, discarding those in which
it does not.
Elsewhere in the Sophist, the paradigm of
letters again arises to signal reflection on the
method at hand and anticipate ways in which
its method of accessing the sources of knowledge is in some sense insufficient (Plat., Soph.
253 a 1-9). In the dialogue’s central digression,
the Stranger considers the need for accounts of
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the elements themselves, with reference to the
ways in which a given element is or is not fit
for blending with other elements. The Stranger
argues that master of the art of spelling knows,
for example, that some letters are fit by nature
to blend with others (e.g., ‘s’ and ‘t’), that some
letters are necessary for ‘binding’ all letters together (i.e., vowels), and that some letters require others for their instantiation and cannot
be voiced on their own (i.e., the mute consonants). In other words, knowledge of the parts
of the word entails more than recognition across
instances, as in the case considered in the Theaetetus, but rather the deeper account of the nature of each part.
The need for blending of elements for selfinstantiation is analogous to the insight that
forms require one another for their own instantiation. The five great kinds – being, motion,
rest, sameness, and difference (Plat., Soph. 251
d 6 – 256 c 9) – are required in all instances,
and only by partaking in some combination of
these great kinds can any form present itself to
discourse.20 That is, in their discursive intelligibility all forms require being to be themselves,
sameness insofar as they are self-same, difference (e.g., non-being, which the Stranger establishes as a form of difference at Plat., Soph. 257 b
3 – 259 b 7) insofar as they are not other forms,
etc.21 Thus, the interdependence of a form on
other forms has been established, at least in a
preliminary way that will require elucidation
later.
The reflection on letters helps illuminate
what bifurcatory division can and cannot accomplish. Like the maieutic method in the
Theaetetus, bifurcatory division allows distinct
wholes to manifest themselves as unities to be
understood. Unlike the maieutic method, bifurcatory division allows a thing to be disclosed
with reference to its elements. In this way, this
method has begun to fulfill the promise articu-

lated by Socrates in the Theaetetus to deliver an
account by which true opinion could be oriented. This is related specifically to the third kind
of account Socrates considers in the Theaetetus:
“being able to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other
things” (Plat., Theait. 208 c 8-9). In other words,
this account is useful insofar as it discloses the
form under investigation with reference to its
participation in difference.22
But the consideration of letters and the identification of the great kinds suggest the need for
developing further methods by which knowledge can be established. Bifurcatory division
lacks a means of yielding an understanding of
the nature of the object qua parts and wholes
and their fitness for combination. Such an account, as the analogy of letters shows, would go
beyond simply displaying the elements in their
order, and entails a further inquiry into their
constitution with reference to the character of
the parts composing them as a whole.
We should be concerned that the elements
themselves have not, in all instances, been fully
disclosed in their nature upon their division.
For example, we can say of ‘animal hunting’ that
it constitutes half of the notion of ‘hunting’, but
little else. If we seek a robust account of the ways
in which a given element lends itself to communing with other elements, we need to know
more about the nature of the element itself. In
this way, the goal of knowing the whole with reference to a full account of its parts has not been
fulfilled and the account is incomplete.
Furthermore, as bifurcatory division continues into the Statesman and the object of knowledge changes from the sophist to the statesman,
the divisions become less precise. With Socrates
the Younger replacing Theaetetus as the Stranger’s interlocutor, the Stranger initially makes
clear that he will proceed in the manner of the
previous dialogue at Plat., Polit. 258 b 1-8. But
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in the initial division in which the interlocutors
seek an account of the statesman, the bifurcatory method (Plat., Polit. 258 b 1 – 267 a 3) causes
the interlocutors to falter, forces digressions,
and ultimately leads to a ‘joke’ (Plat., Polit. 266
c 1).
Starting at Plat., Polit. 258 b 1, the initial
bifurcatory division of the statesman begins in
the manner of the Sophist before Socrates’ the
Younger’s disproportionate division of animals
into human and non-human animals (Plat.,
Polit. 262 a 4-7) causes the Stranger to reflect
on the proper method of proportionate division
and the philosophical value of cutting in two
(Plat., Polit. 261 e 1 – 264 b 8). When the bifurcatory division continues, the Stranger makes
the sudden and jarring suggestion that there are
in fact two possible paths (Plat., Polit. 265 a 4-7),
both of which yield confusing and unsatisfying
‘diagonal’ motion. When the ultimate results
entail the statesman “running around with the
herd” and “having kept up in the race with the
one among men who for his part is the most excellently trained for an easily managed life,” the
Stranger deems that the divisions have yielded a
“laughable” account (Plat., Polit. 266 b 3 – c 1).

IV. NON-BIFURCATORY DIVISION
AND THE ‘GOD-GIVEN
METHOD’
The Stranger will soon (at Plat., Polit. 287 b
3) alter his method of division in the pursuit of
the statesman in response to the laughable account. The groundwork for the shift begins to
be laid in the preceding myth of ages. In the
myth, the Stranger describes the current state
of the cosmos, in which the care for human
community is no longer the job of the gods, but
instead is that of the human community itself.
Hence the paradigm that the Stranger then be-
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gins to draw upon is ‘care’ (ἐπιμέλεια, Plat., Polit.
276 d 1-4), and specifically care for the human
community.23
The guidance of the care paradigm will ultimately help the Stranger to come to the final account of the statesman. Prior to this, the Stranger
leads Socrates the Younger through a digression
on dialectic that informs the change of method
leading to the final account.24 He considers the
value of paradigms in inquiry with reference to
letters and their ability to help young learners of
spelling find their way from the known to the
unknown, stating that recognizing letters brings
young learners back
…first to those cases in which they were
correctly judging these same letters, and,
while leading them back, set[s] alongside
them the ones not yet recognized, and
by throwing them side by side to indicate that there’s the same similarity and
nature in both intertwinings, until the
letters that are truly judged have been
shown as juxtaposed with all the ones
about which there’s ignorance, and having been shown, thereby becoming paradigms, bring it about that each one of all
the letters in all the syllables is always
addressed on the same terms with itself:
as other when it’s other than other letters,
and same when it’s the same (Plat., Polit.
278 a 8 – c 1).
The Stranger concludes that in this way
a paradigm through which an object can be
known is derived “when what is the same in
something other that’s sundered from it is correctly judged;” this allows the learner to bring
to completion “one true opinion about each of
them as about both together” (Plat., Polit. 278 c
3 – 5). This suggests steps beyond those indicated in the Theaetetus and Sophist, as the Strang-

16

|

Dialectical Methods and the Stoicheia Paradigm in Plato’s Trilogy and Philebus

er here discusses letters as a means of passing
from opinion to knowledge through study of
the unknown with reference to the known. That
is, the nature of the unknown is here described
as accessible by means of the known, suggesting the ways in which an understanding of the
known letter guides the learner into an understanding of the nature of that which is presently
unknown.
With these notions established, and following the guidance of the care paradigm, the
Stranger proceeds to divide in a non-bifurcatory
manner. He says little about this new method,
stating only that they will now “divide limb by
limb, like a sacrificial animal, since we don’t
have the power to do it by two,” cutting “with
an eye to the number nearest” (Plat., Polit. 287 c
3-6). In other words, the process of dividing will
no longer yield binaries, but instead will make
the number of cuts appropriate to the thing being cut. The notion of ‘limbs’ suggests that these
divisions will be in response to the specific nature of the thing being divided, instead of the
uniform bifurcatory cuts.
The exact nature of the final inquiry into the
statesman (from 287 c 9 to the dialogue’s conclusion at 311 c 5) has been debated.25 I follow
the interpretation worked out by Mitchell Miller
in a series of articles in which Miller interprets
the set of final divisions as a non-bifurcatory
diairetic account of the form of care for the human community in fifteen cuts, each an independent moment within the spectrum of care
bounded on each end by those arts attending to
the material and spiritual needs of the community. These include the seven productive (or indirectly responsive) arts related to the material
life of human community: producers of (1) raw
materials, (2) tools, (3) containers, (4) vehicles,
(5) defenses, (6) amusements, and (7) nourishment (Plat., Polit. 287 c 9 – 289 c 2). These are
followed by the one productive and directly re-

sponsive art, (8) slavery (Plat., Polit. 289 c 3 – d
1). Finally, by this interpretation the Stranger
identifies the seven directly responsive arts attending to the spiritual life of the human community: (9) merchants and traders, (10) heralds
and clerks, (11) priests and diviners, (12) rhetoricians, (13) generals, (14) adjudicators, and
finally, (15) the statesman (Plat., Polit. 289 e 2
– 290 e, 303 b 9 – 305 e 5).
This interpretation hinges on an understanding of the middle term, (8) slavery, as entailing a mix of indirect and direct care, insofar
as slaves are both goods and agents, and both
passively used to meet needs qua possession
and actively engaged in the human community
qua human agent.26 In this way, the division is
neither bifurcatory nor trifurcatory, but instead
yields a unified spectrum bounded by these two
distinct poles. In other words, each art is situated relative to the material and spiritual needs
in care for the human community to different
extents, and the balance between a given art’s
care for material and spiritual needs positions it
relatively among the others.
Importantly, this has yielded an account of
these elements insofar as they are constituted by
one another in their mutual relations to the two
extremes of the material and spiritual needs of
the human community by which they are defined. In this way, the non-bifurcatory division
undertaken here has yielded a spectrum, where
each point represents an instance of limit, the
identity of which is defined by the points of
limit elsewhere on the same spectrum. Each of
these points of limit thus indicates a ratio between, at the far end, concern with the material
life of the city, and on the near, concern with the
spiritual life of the city, with slavery positioned
at the midpoint where the two extremes are in
balance. This maps on to Socrates’ second type
of account from the Theaetetus, where Socrates
had described the account in which one is able
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to answer the question of what a thing is “by reference to its elements” (Plat., Theait. 206 e 10–
207 a 2).
The Stranger says little about his intentions
in changing methods midway through the
Stateman. A consideration of the “god-given
method” that Socrates describes in the Philebus,
which seems to describe a process of coming
upon knowledge through means similar to the
non-bifurcatory divisions in the Statesman, will
help to give content to the method and also to
use the letter paradigm to reflect on these dialectical methods in one more important way.27
At Plat., Phil. 16 c 8 – 17 a 4, Socrates speaks
in praise of the ‘finest way’ of investigating by
means of a “gift of gods hurled down from heaven by some Prometheus along with a most dazzling fire”.28 Socrates explains:
…whatever is said to be consists of one
and many, having in its nature limit and
unlimitedness. Since this is the structure
of things, we have to assume that there
is in each case always one form for every
one of them, and we must search for it, as
we will indeed find it there. And once we
have grasped it, we must look for two, as
the case would have it, or if not, for three
or some other number. And we must treat
every one of those further unities in the
same way, until it is not only established
of the original unit that it is one, many
and unlimited, but also how many kinds
it is. For we must not grant the form of
the unlimited to plurality before we know
the exact number of every plurality that
lies between the unlimited and the one.
[…] Nowadays the clever ones among us
make a one, haphazardly, and a many,
faster or slower than they should; they
go straight from the one to the unlimited
and omit the intermediates. It is these [in-

|

17

termediates], however, that make all the
difference as to whether we are engaged
with each other in dialectical or only in
eristic discourse. (Plat., Phil. 16 d 1 – e
2, 17 a 1-5).29
Let us note several similarities between
Socrates’ opaque account here in the Philebus
and the Stranger’s non-bifurcatory division in
the Statesman. First, Socrates says again here
that the goal when using this method is to understand the whole with reference to twoness,
threeness, or any number appropriate to the
nature of the thing under investigation, as was
the case in cutting the sacrificial animal with an
eye to the number nearest. Second, the claim
that “whatever is said to be consists of one and
many” has “limit and unlimitedness” maps directly onto the structure of care for the human
community that the Stranger articulated in the
Statesman. For there, care for the human community was shown to be one (care) and many
(a set of fifteen determinate moments). Furthermore, care for the human community was
shown to be unlimited (insofar as it entails an
unlimited dyadic spectrum between care for
the material life and spiritual life of the city)
and yet also have limit (the fifteen determinate
points within that spectrum in which the conditions of the spectrum generate intelligible moments of care).30 In other words, care is one and
many, and unlimited and limited. Furthermore,
Socrates’ emphasis on “the intermediates” (τὰ
μέσα, Plat., Phil. 18 c 3 – d 1) echoes the key
move in the Stranger’s analysis of care; for there
the Stranger moved from the analysis of productive arts to directly responsive arts upon identifying their midpoint, slaves, which clarified the
two poles of the unlimited dyadic spectrum. In
this way, the Stranger’s account was able to rise
to the level of true “dialectic” (Plat., Phil. 17 b 6
and Plat., Polit. 285 d 5).31
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We can do some work to understand this
new method by considering Socrates’ examples
in the Philebus. Socrates helps his interlocutors
Protarchus and Philebus to grasp this method
through two examples: the scale of musical tones
and the discernment of vocalic sounds that are
represented independently by letters (Plat., Phil.
17 b 3 – 18 d 2). Here he initially notes that “the
sound that comes out of the mouth is one […]
but then it is also unlimited in number;” thus
“if we know how many kinds of vocal sounds
there are and what their nature is, that makes
every one of us literate” (Plat., Phil. 17 b 4-7). In
the case of musical sounds, the one of the form
‘tone’ is defined with reference to each pitch residing on that tone. Thus, an understanding of
(e.g.) C sharp is attained with reference to C (as
a lower tone) and D (as a higher tone). Understanding C and D, thus, entails understanding
C flat (B) and C sharp, and D flat and D sharp,
respectively. In this way, knowledge of tones as
determinate points of limit along the indeterminate spectrum of tones entails understanding each of the many in its nature, and the ways
in which each nature proceeds from the nature
of the spectrum and its defining points on this
spectrum.
In the case of tones, Socrates moves from the
one (tone) to the many (the number of tones instantiated on the tone spectrum). In his second
example, that of the vocalic sounds creating letters, Socrates describes the discovery of the letter spectrum by the Egyptian Theuth (Plat., Phil.
18 b 6 – d 2) as an example of proceeding from
the many (vocalized sounds) to the one (the vocalic sound spectrum).32 Socrates explains that
Theuth discovered
that the vowels in that unlimited variety
are not one but several, and again that
there are others that are not voiced, but
make some kind of noise, and that they,

too, have a number. As a third kind of
letters he established the ones we now call
mute (ibid).
That is, Theuth divided vocalic sounds into
three categories: the voiced, the unvoiced but
sounded, and the mutes. These he then subdivided based on the number appropriate to the
kind of each. Here the spectrum is bounded
on the one side by voiced letters (the vowels),
the intermediate letters that are unvoiced but
sounded, and the mutes.
Importantly, Socrates notes that Theuth “realized that none of us could gain any knowledge
of a single one of [the letters], taken by itself without understanding them all” (Plat., Phil. 18 c 8 –
d 2). In other words, a letter is only understood
in its nature when the co-constitutive parts like
it in kind have been understood in their own natures. Thus the method of non-bifurcatory division has provided a way of understanding each
element in its nature with reference to the other
elements that situate it and define its character
as such. And the consideration of this distinction with reference to letters points to an important takeaway regarding the method when
we return our attention back to the account of
care for the human community. For this suggests that something like material production
of raw goods is understood only when it is apprehended with reference to the other points that
constitute its being on its particular spectrum.
In other words, no one determinate moment of
care is without the other determinate moments
by which it is co-constituted; likewise, it cannot
be known in the fullest sense prior to being understood in its context within the spectrum of
care. Thus, analyses of, e.g., the letter Eta, or C
natural, or the art of producing raw goods, will
fail when they are conducted only with reference to these elements as such. Instead, it is only
when these elements are understood as points
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of limit within their co-constitutive many and
the one that comprises the many can the elements be known and analyzed.

V. CONCLUSION
To conclude and take stock of where our investigation of these methods has taken us, let us
review our steps with reference to the notion of
the letter. In the consideration of the Theaetetus we encountered the provocative suggestion
that one only knows the spelling of a word (e.g.,
‘Θεαίτητος’, or, more precisely, the first syllable
of this word, ‘Θε’) if one recognizes its component parts when they appear elsewhere (e.g.,
the appearance of the first syllable in the name
‘Θεόδωρος’, or, more precisely, both parts composing the many that is the one syllable ‘Θε’). We
saw that in the Sophist the Eleatic Stranger both
seeks to understand with reference to structure
and argues that knowledge of a concept (here a
letter) entails an account of the further concepts
(letters) like in kind with which the element is
fit to mix. In the Statesman, the Stranger indicates the ways in which known letters can direct
the learner toward not-yet-known letters by allowing the learner to begin to grasp the nature
of the unknown through its fitness to combine
with other known elements like it in kind. This
process further reveals previously concealed aspects of the known to the learner as well, insofar as it draws out newly revealed aspects of the
known element’s nature. In the account of the
‘god-given method’ in the Philebus with reference to its application in the non-bifurcatory
division in the Statesman, we saw that Socrates
uses letters to explain that knowledge of a concept (letter as vocalic sound) is derived only
when its situation among all the other concepts
(i.e., the other letters) to which it owes its composition has been understood. Our knowledge
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of the constitutive structure of the form has
provided insight into the being of the form as a
one and as a many, both limited and unlimited.
This understanding of the one as subjected to
both an unlimited plurality and a limited many
through the imposition of limit represents a further nuance offered by the dialectical methods
that unfold over the course of the trilogy. The
unity of these methods that has emerged from
our consideration of these methods can act as
a provocation towards further considerations of
the Platonic education, and aid in the turning of
our souls from becoming to being as Socrates
describes in the central books of the Republic.33
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NOTES
1

The three dialogues take place in a two-day period,
probably in spring 399 BCE as argued at Nails
2002, 320. The trilogy is situated definitively within
Socrates’ life by Socrates’ mention of his plans to
meet the summons of Meletus later on the day of
the Theaetetus, setting the dialogues in the months
before his trial. It bears noting that the exchange
depicted in the Euthyphro, set outside of the King’s
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Archon’s court, occurs between the Theaetetus and
the Sophist and Statesman on the following day.
For a discussion of the dramatic and philosophical connections between the Euthyphro and this
trilogy, see Wiitala 2014, passim. Furthermore, it
has been argued that the Cratylus might also have
been set on the day of the trial, e.g. by Sallis 1996,
225-230. Others, e.g. Nails 2002, 312-313, argue that
the Cratylus is in fact set some two decades prior.
In any event, we should notice that the conclusions
and apparent aporia of other dialogues, including
at least the Euthyphro and maybe the Cratylus, give
further context to the progress made between the
Theaetetus and the Statesman. I will not develop
this point here, but it should be remembered that
philosophical methods are employed here under
the dramatic backdrop of Socrates’ impending trial
and execution, including that the philosopher had
not properly been differentiated from the sophist by
the citizens of Athens. Thus the methods are given a
political and historical framework as well.
For a general overview of proleptic in Platonic
dialogues, see Kahn 1988, passim, but especially
541-542 and 547-549.
This is not a claim about Plato’s development, but
instead a claim about the relationship between dialogues independent of the chronology of their composition. I generally take it that Plato’s dialogues
are intended as pedagogical exercises for students
of the academy, not expositions of doctrines, and
hence assume that these methods are intended for
pedagogical purposes.
In this paper I follow Ambuel 2007 38-39, and
Miller 2016, 6 in reading only division, and not
‘collection and division’ as is often named in
the literature, at play in Sophist and Statesman.
Sayre 2006, 36-37 offers a helpful discussion of
the terminology and the absence of ‘collection’
(sunagōgē) in ‘titular’ references to division in the
Sophist and Statesman (i.e., Plat., Soph. 235 c 8 and
253 d 1; Plat., Polit. 284 a 4 – 5 and 286 d 9). Miller
argues that ‘collection and division’ is a term imported from the Phaedrus (Plat., Phaid. 266 b 4-6)
and not clearly at play in the “Eleatic” dialogues.
Ambuel argues that collection cannot be at play
in the Sophist due to an unresolved ambiguity
between appearance and reality. Other commentators have argued that collection is at play in the
Sophist; see, e.g., Bluck 1975, 33-40, Notomi 1999,
2 fn. 75, and Ionescu 2013, passim. Cornford and
Klein each hold middle positions, as Cornford
argues that collection is not at play in the method
of the interlocutors but is nonetheless exhibited
throughout the movement of the text (Cornford
1935, 171), while Klein
holds that each articulation of the preceding
divisions counts as a collection (Klein 1977,
14ff).
E.g., in Miller 1990, passim.
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Other discussions of the role of letters in the
dialogues include Gómez-Lobo 1977, Miller 1992,
Notomi 1999, Gill 2006, Sanday 2015a, and Smith
2018.
For example, Socrates situates his city-soul analogy
in the Republic with reference to small and large
letters (Plat., Rep. 368 c 7 – d 7) and its grammatical
aspect with reference to the recognition of letters
(Plat., Rep. 379 a – d).
For the interpretation of Platonic paradigms that I
follow, see Sanday 2017, passim, and Smith 2018. For
the conflicting view that the notion of paradigms
changes in different dialogues, see Gill 2006,
passim.
Theaetetus describes this account in hazy terms,
and Socrates later characterizes it as a ‘dream’
(Plat. Theait. 201 d 9), suggesting that the definition derives from a hazy and pre-discursive source.
For a thorough account of the implications of this
account’s ‘dreamlike’ status, see Burnyeat 1970, passim. For the influential challenge (given in 1952 but
unpublished until 1990) to the view that knowledge
of forms could be at play in the dream theory, see
Ryle 1990, passim. Ryle’s view is rebuked by Lesher
1969, passim and Miller 1992, especially 87-90.
Other commentators have also suggested that
Socrates’ dismissal of his descriptions of ‘account’
are not as definitive as they might initially seem.
Gómez-Lobo 1977, 31, and Desjardins 1981, 11, both
argue that these definitions foreshadow elements
in the “Eleatic” dialogues. Miller 1992, especially
94-104 and Miller 2016, especially 321-322, also
discusses the ways in which the final two senses of
‘account’ in the Theaetetus correspond to the methodology in the Sophist and Statesman.
Theaetetus translations taken from Sachs unless
noted otherwise. Consistently throughout this
paper I replace ‘articulation’ with ‘account’ in
translating ‘λόγος’. I follow Fine 1979, passim in
interpreting Plato’s use of ‘λόγος’ as stronger than
that entailed merely by the English ‘statement’. For
further discussion of interpretations of ‘λόγος’ in
Plato’s writing, see Burnyeat 1990, 136-149.
Snyder 2016, passim has recently done work to show
that Socrates’ midwife role in the Theaetetus entails
Socrates’ use of epistemic failure to increase the
efficacy of his methodology. Snyder argues that the
bi-product of this experience is creating, within
his interlocutors, wisdom regarding the use of this
method to generate a sort of provocative aporia
(Snyder 2016, 8). These points are helpful to consider
the positive gains of this method, that is, the important step of aporia that acts as a provocation toward
further investigations.
With minor alterations to Sachs’s translation. In
this way, Theaetetus demonstrates that he has not
made the final step of knowledge of mathematical objects to knowledge of forms described in the
middle books of the Republic.
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As mentioned above, commentators who have argued this include Gómez-Lobo 1977, 31, Desjardins
1981, 11, Miller 1992, especially 94-104 and Miller
2016, especially 321-322. For a helpful discussion
of the Theaetetus’ ‘ending well,’ see Haring 1982,
passim.
Spelling is at issue in various ways throughout this
passage, but is discussed explicitly at Plat., Theait.
202 e 7 – 204 a 9, 206 a 3-8, and 207 a 8 – 208 c 4.
Here I am using my own example of moving from
parts to whole to maintain the letters example.
Socrates’ analogous example at Plat., Theait. 207 a
4 is the description of the wagon as “wheels, axle,
box, poles, crossbar”. For without an account of the
inner-workings of these parts, we have merely a
heap of parts, or a heap of letters in my example.
Whether division entails discovery or demonstration has been a debated subject since antiquity.
Crombie 1963, 2:382 articulates an influential argument that the method is concerned with demonstration, not discovery. Here I follow Ionescu 2013,
passim, who argues that division entails discovery
(acquisition) and can take up objects of knowledge
ranging from images to forms, corresponding to the
objects of knowledge discussed in the divided line
analogy.
Sophist and Statesman translations are taken from
the Brann, Kalkavage, and Salem editions, with
minor modifications noted.
This explanation comes in the midst of the
Stranger’s description of what exactly the dialectician discerns, from Plat. Soph. 253 d 5 – e 3, which
has been notoriously divisive among commentators.
Here the Stranger says that the diairetic dialectician
“…has an adequate perception of one form (εἶδος)
extended everywhere through many things, each
of which lies apart, and also many forms which are
other than one another and are embraced by one
external to them; again, he perceives one unified
form composed of many wholes as well as many
forms marked off as entirely apart. But to know this
is to know how to discern, according to kind, where
each is able to commune and where not” (Plat.,
Soph. 253 d 7 – e 3, substituting ‘form’ for Brann, et
al.’s term ‘look’ in translating ‘εἶδος’, to use the term
consistently with previous renderings above.) These
lines have been interpreted as (i) a description of
collection (d 5 – 7) and division (d 7 – 9) respectively, as by Cornford 1953 and Sayre 2006; (ii) an
anticipation of the discussion of the five greatest
kinds, as by Gómez-Lobo 1977; (iii) as something of
a hybrid (albeit earlier) version of (i) and (ii), as by
Stenzel 1964; and (iv) as pointing both to non-bifurcatory division (d 5 – 7) and bifurcatory division (d
7 – 9), as by Miller 2016. I remain agnostic on this
issue here due to spatial limitations, but suggest that
my interpretation does not hinge on a commitment
or lack thereof to any of these lines of
interpretation.
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It bears noting that the Stranger does not claim
that this list of five great kinds is exhaustive. It
is possible that there are others. Plato’s character
Parmenides in his eponymous dialogue describes
likeness, unlikeness, oneness, and multitude (Plat.,
Parm. 129 d 2 – 130 b 8) in such a way as to suggest
that these kinds are co-constitutive of forms in a
similar way; but I lack the space to develop this connection here. For more on this possibility, see Miller
1986, especially 176-185, and Sanday 2015a, especially 154-165. Regardless of the list of great kinds,
the important takeaway here is that structure of a
given form requires its participation in other forms,
and an understanding of a given form requires an
account of the ways in which its nature requires
participation in other forms.
For a discussion of the senses in which forms have
been understood to be in motion and a novel interpretation of the communing of forms as the sense of
motion, see Wiitala 2018, passim.
The value of bifurcatory division in Platonic education has been debated. Crombie 1963 and Ryle
1966 both argue that the method is valuable only
to philosophical amateurs, while Brown 2010, 168
argues that although the method is unsuccessful
in the Sophist (since sophistry is not a techne but is
instead amorphous) it remained a viable method for
students in Plato’s academy. For discussions of the
value of non-bifurcatory division and its relevance
to Platonic metaphysics, see Miller 1999, Ionescu
2014, and Ionescu 2016.
For more on the ways in which the myth of ages
prepares the way for the digression on method (Plat.
Polit. 277 a 2 – 287 b 2) and the role of the care
paradigm in the subsequent non-bifurcatory division, see Ionescu 2014, especially 42-45, and Ionescu
2016, especially 95-99. For more on the role of
paradigms in the dialogue, see Sanday 2017, passim
and Smith 2018, passim.
For more on the components of this digression – the
notion of paradigm, the paradigms of care and the
weaver, and the notion of due measure – and their
role in allowing for the change of method, see Smith
2018, passim.
Miller articulates his view in depth at Miller 1990,
343-346, and expands upon it further in a 1999
article reprinted at Miller 2004, 141-161. Of the
numerous differing interpretations of this passage,
noteworthy are Goldschmidt 1947, passim, who
holds that the passage has a bifurcatory structure,
and Ackrill 1970, passim, who argues that some
divisions throughout Sophist and Statesman exhibit
a non-bifurcatory structure.
Miller 1990, 345 discusses slavery and its position in
the spectrum composing care for the human community in more depth.
For more on the connection between the final,
non-bifurcatory division and the god-given method,
see Miller 2004, 141-161, Ionescu 2014, passim, and
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Ionescu 2016, passim. For a broad and helpful overview of the notions of science, method, and truth at
play in the Philebus, see Harvey 2012, passim.
Philebus translations taken from the Frede edition.
The exact nature of this method has been debated.
For the view that the ‘god-given method’ entails
both collection and division, see Benson 2007, passim and Fletcher 2017, especially 184-191.
For a discussion of the distinction between ‘unlimited’ in this technical sense and its usage elsewhere
in the dialogue, see Sanday 2015b, 367 f.11.
At Plat., Polit. 285 d 5, the Stranger asks Socrates the
Younger whether the analysis of the statesman is
for the pursuit of knowledge of the statesman only,
or the pursuit of skill in dialectics more broadly.
Socrates the Younger picks the latter.
The relationship between the types of investigation
indicated by the tones and letters example has been
controversial. Hackforth 1945, 26 understands the
two as fundamentally unified by an initial intuition
into the unity of the object of inquiry. Harte 2002,
204 offers helpful discussion of the sense in which
the imposition of structure upon tone provides the
tone scale with its identity. For the interpretation of
this passage as marking the distinction between the
‘learning procedure’ and ‘discovery procedure’ in
the ‘god-given method,’ see Fletcher 2017, especially
188-189.
For extensive, helpful feedback on and contributions to previous drafts of this paper, I am indebted
to members of the University of Kentucky Philosophy Department, the participants in the 2nd annual
University of Chicago Graduate Conference in
Ancient Philosophy, including commentator Amber
Ace, and anonymous reviewers for PLATO JOURNAL: The Journal of the International Plato Society.

